Syrian Awakening?
Less than an hour after having his unlicensed vegetable cart confiscated and being slapped by a Tunisian policewoman, humiliated street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi cried out for dignity by setting himself on fire, unknowingly putting a flamethrower to long smoldering resentment across the Arab world that soon toppled Ben Ali and Mubarak. Eight long, violent months later, world media attention has fallen on the Syrian crackdown, where brutalized, beleaguered protestors recently got a much-needed shot in the arm as a third Arab autocrat, Muammar Qaddafi, fell in Libya. To better understand Syria today and how it fits into the complex web of inter-state rivalries in the Middle East – this paper examines the historical evolution, national identity and current challenges facing Syria.
French Mandates
In the wake of World War I, what had been “Syria” for centuries under Ottoman rule and before, was carved up by the French. “Greater Lebanon” was created, Damascus and Aleppo were made capitals of separate mini-states, the Alawi and Druze Mountains were proclaimed independent and, most painfully for Syrians, much was conceded to the Turks, cutting the300,000 square kilometers of Ottoman Syria (included what is today Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip and parts of Iraq and Turkey) down to 185,000 . The loss of Greater Syria has never been forgiven and, today, many proud Syrians understand their history as a string of historical grievances and injustices at the hands of the West, nursing a particularly acute sense of bitterness.
Like many colonial powers, the French recognized that empowering minority groups, and thereby weakening the majority group (Sunni Arab Muslims), i.e. dividing the colonized against themselves, would enhance French control. While roughly three-fourths of Syrians were Sunni Arabs; Kurds, Maronite Christians, Druze and the Alawi Shi’a were all significant minorities. The French began to see Alawis as a ‘reliable minority’ granting them privileges even the Maronite Christians did not enjoy. Most auspiciously, the French targeted Alawis, whose poverty made them easy recruits, for service in the French army. The training, discipline, status and sometimes Western education bestowed on the Alawis by French patronage gave them new status and confidence and, most importantly for Syrian history, they would never let go of their grip on the military.
A Precocious Alawi Rises
It was into the middle of this pivotal colonial period in the mountain village of Qurdaha that the Alawi of the Kalbiya tribe , Hafez Al-Assad , would be born in 1930. Hafez was a standout student and, true to his family name, was combative in the schoolyard, worked hard to overcome his Alawi label and grew resentful of discrimination, injustice, and inequality, developing class-consciousness at an early age . Hafiz also came of age in a period of intense ideological struggle along the classic fault lines of Syrian politics, with Communists, Baathists, Syrian Nationalists and the Muslim Brotherhood all battling for supremacy. Assad felt the sting of Syrian and Arab disgrace from the French, the Turks and Zionists and was inspired by a message of Arab cultural and historical glory, joining the Pan-Arab, social revolutionary Baath party in 1946 at age 16 .
Syrian Baathism
Baathism spoke to those Arabs who, feeling disrespected and bulldozed by the modern world, wanted to believe in themselves again. Pan-Arab Baathism emphasized secularism, freedom from foreign domination and overturning the concentration of wealth and power built on exploitation of workers. But to many pious Muslims, secular Arab Nationalism was wholly incompatible with Islam’s universalism, which Baath founder Michael Aflaq tried to reconcile by declaring “Islam is the most sublime expression of Arabism” . A Christian, Aflaq showed great deference to Islam, asserting “Islam is Arab’s history, philosophy, legal and social systems to be proud of”. Hafiz Al-Assad, physically strong, passionate and aggressive was recruited to Baath Party headquarters and quickly went to the violent front lines of the youth movement, circulating petitions and Baathist writings and building a name for himself while finding Sunni street allies, most prominently Mustafa Tlas who would become a lifelong trusted friend, advisor and Minister of Defense.
Assad’s Military Career Begins
In the tumultuous period of French withdrawal and its aftermath (1941-1954), Syria was chaotic and without strong leadership, going through a series of military dictators and lacking a coherent ideology or social or economic policy. Unchecked free speech reigned and in the year 1949 alone there were 3 coups. After graduation in 1952 Assad was still poor and without many options and decided to enroll at the Military Academy in Homs, later becoming part of Syria’s first class of 15 Air Force cadets .
As a mountain boy himself, one of Assad’s early idols was countryside revolutionary, Akram al-Hawrani, who led a peasant revolt proclaiming “land belongs to him who works it” . In the early 50s most Syrians were desperately poor. GDP was $157, 36% of deaths were children under 5, malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhea and entiritis were widespread and Syria’s 2 million agricultural peasants lived mostly in mud huts without electricity, running water or sewage and worked long hours for wealthy absentee capitalist landlords. The Syrian state was too weak and non-interventionist to do much about it, but with Hawrani’s emergence, Assad began to visualize a different Syria.After the demoralizing loss of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Egypt’s charismatic and strong leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser seemed to be the long-awaited Arab savior. In 1956, after the West withdrew promises of aid to build the Aswan High Dam, Nasser boldly nationalized the Suez Canal, standing up to Britain and France in a monumental act for restoring wounded Arab pride. Syria, entranced by Nasser and feeling threatened by the Israelis, the Hashemites in Iraq and the Saudis, impulsively followed Pan-Arabist ideology and formed a union with Egypt in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. Part of Nasser’s shunning of the West was finding a new sponsor in Soviet Russia. In 1958, Assad would personally benefit from the new relationship, and was sent off for a year of fighter pilot training in the USSR where his eyes were opened to the realities of a superpower . Upon his return to Syria, Assad found a lot had changed. Not only was his beloved Baath Party headquarters deserted (Nasser, always paranoid about parties, disbanded it) but Syrians had a laundry list of grievances about union; unfair Egyptian competition, onerous banking and trade regulations, Egyptian spies, closed Syrian embassies and especially the heavy-handedness of Nasser’s security forces in Syria. Quite simply, Nasser gutted Syrian politics, eliminating the Syrian army’s influence, while cracking down on communists and Baathists. Though Assad looked up to Nasser he also saw his weaknesses and foreswore them, learning to be secretive, cautious, patient, listen to his opponents and to have a good memory.
The Cairo Conspiracy
It was in 1960 while on assignment in Cairo, that Assad and 4 other officers (Muhammad Umran, Salah Jadid, Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, and Ahmad al-Mir) formed a secret “military committee,” in what came to be called the Cairo Conspiracy, and would later lead to the Baath Party seizing power in Syria. Umran, Jadid and Assad, all rural intellectuals, agreed on three goals; rebuild the Baath Party, protect the union and overturn the old Syrian social order .
Assad’s frustration grew further when, in September 1961, a lieutenant colonel backed by Jordan, Saudi and the Syrian business community, pulled off a coup, snatching Syria from the UAR. Nasser, furious, sent 2,000 paratroopers to Syria but soon relented and had them flown back to Cairo, and the UAR was dead after just 3 years . The idealistic dream of union had crashed into messy, complicated political reality, tearing many intellectuals in half and causing a two-way flood of civil servants going home. 1962 was another year of coup and counter-coup chaos. In order not to miss the opportunity, the Military Committee allied with Nasserists and successfully stormed the citadel in Aleppo, only to be horrified as their Nasserist allies hoisted the UAR flag. The Military Committee, feeling betrayed, could not bear a return to unequal Nasser-dominated union and backed out of the coup. Assad fled to Lebanon only to be caught, jailed and later released. At 31, Assad, unaccustomed to failure, had seen his meteoric political ascent abruptly halted, he had no money, had been jailed and identified by the regime as a troublemaker and was devastated by Syrian secession.
Baath Rule Begins
After much planning and carefully securing allies (again including the Nasserists), in March of 1963, the Military Committee engineered an almost bloodless, lightning coup and this time made sure that they would have the upper hand over the Nasserists . The Baath Party quickly went to work consolidating power, drafting back large numbers of Baathist reserve officers and ensuring the Homs Military Academy was firmly in Baathist hands and began cranking out loyal Baathist officers. A 22-man National Council for Revolutionary Command (12 Baathists, 8 Nasserists and 2 independents) was formed, but the real levers of power were firmly within the secretive Baathist Military Committee, a “junta within a junta ”. The Nasserists, however, did not take their marginalization lying down, leading to a decisive Military Committee show of force - a “coup within a coup” - ousting 50 pro-Egypt officers and later purging or crushing the remaining Nasser loyalists over 4 bloody months . It was a purge, essentially anti-union with Egypt, that put the Pan-Arab core of Baathist doctrine into question.Though Assad was now in charge of the Dumayr military base, the older Military Committee members dominated political power and 1963-1970 served as Assad’s apprenticeship for power. Assad debated with Marxists, tried to translate his ideals into practical policies, and most critically worked to create an “ideological army” by politically educating troops, putting Baath loyalists in key positions and creating a hierarchical structure of party cells, divisions and branches in the army with himself at the top . With domestic political rivals in relative abeyance, the Baathists set about to “end the exploitation by a handful of families ”. In 1965, over 12,000 workers and over 100 companies, including the electric power, oil and cotton industries were nationalized. Under siege, the resentful merchants allied with Islamic preachers, but the newly formed Baathist National Guard and the Workers’ Militia were ready, confiscating businesses, breaking shopfronts, appointing new prayer leaders and taking over administration of awqaf (religious property) and ultimately righting the Syrian socialist ship.
The Revolution with the Revolution
The Baath Party itself was also divided, with the more urban, civilian “old guard” led by Aflaq and Bitar (both Sorbonne-educated Damascenes) pitted against Assad and the younger, largely rural, officers. By 1966, the old Baath vs. Neo-Baath tension had boiled over as both bodies passed contradictory laws, culminating in a bloody intra-party coup – an Assad engineered rout – that purged or arrested over 400 officers and ended with Assad rising to Minister of Defense at the age of 35 . Ruler Salah Jadid (an Alawi), lacking patronage networks or even a modicum of legitimacy, nevertheless slammed ahead with nationalization and land reform, seizing homes and private schools, slashing salaries, purging the corrupt, ruthlessly crushing opponents and banishing anyone with a connection to the old powerful families, prompting a rural exodus into the cities.
With such reckless governance and social upheaval, a coup was only a matter of time. When a group of officers, led by Colonel Salim Hatum, ambushed Jadid in the Druze stronghold of Suwayda, Assad demonstrated his power, promptly sending in the Air Force and forcing Hatum to flee to Jordan and saving Jadid. Yet again, a round of officer purges led to some 400 dismissals for “suspected disloyalty,” leaving the Syrian officer corps severely depleted .It was in this chaotic context of military weakness, panic and paranoia, with Nasser, King Husayn and King Faysal all scheming for a Baathist collapse, that Israel emerged as the dominant preoccupation of Syrian politics. Israel, feeling similarly threatened from all sides, had cracked codes and was monitoring Syrian communications and reviewing Syria’s Golan Heights defenses . Despite his passionate support of the Palestinian cause, Assad was a man of order and caution and therefore, in vehement opposition to Jadid’s chief of staff, wanted to rein in Palestinian groups harassing Israel from Syrian territory.
Tension Rising
Since the 1949 Syria-Israeli armistice, Syria had been fighting itself, racked by near permanent revolution. Israel, under David Ben Gurion, by contrast, had launched a series of rapid development projects as part of a historic nation-building mission. Israel had long dealt with the Palestinian problem by holding Arab states responsible for policing Palestinian guerilla activity near Israeli frontiers, punishing security lapses with pre-emptive strikes to keep battles off of Israeli soil. After Nasser signed a bilateral defense pact with Syria, Israel felt threatened on another level and retaliated by storming 5 miles into the West Bank in Jordan, Syria promptly declared holy war and Nasser, after posing as the fearless Arab champion, drew taunts from King Husayn for not readying for war himself. Nasser, knowing Egypt was unprepared and fearing he would be sucked in to war by the reckless Syrians, ordered UN troops out of Sinai and sent in Egyptian in a bid to steer the conflict away from Syria into his own hands. However, with the Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian publics already infected with war fever, Nasser could not afford to appear soft and announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships. Israel, which had long avowed that closing the Straits constituted an act of war, now had their pretext, smelling blood, Israel saw their chance to teach their Arab nemesis Nasser a lesson.
With tensions sky high, the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 began with a surprise Israeli onslaught of stunning scaleand speed and ended as one of the most traumatic and humiliating episodes of modern Arab history. 50,000 poorly trained Syrians without enough commanding officers (successive rounds of Baathist-led purges had left only a fraction of the officers needed to command 50,000 soldiers) and just 250 operational tanks, 100 MiG 17s, no air defense missiles and no navy were no match for the well-trained, French- and US-armed Israelis . In just 6 days, Egypt lost Sinai, Jordan lost the West Bank and Syria lost Golan . Tens of thousands of refugees poured in to Damascus, officers blamed civilian leadership, civilians blamed the officers, many demanded Assad’s resignation and the Baathist regime hit an all new popularity low. Assad was jolted by the war and the personal criticism he received, but saw the war wholly as a result of the incompetence of others. He blamed the bellicose words of Jadid’s ministers who confused slogans and taunts with real power. He blamed Jadid for letting Palestinian guerillas wreak havoc and for Syria’s isolationism. Above all, in the wake of war, Assad grew determined to rule, free from the constraints of colleagues and rivals who he was convinced had led the country to disaster . With his eyes firmly on power Assad went to work, slowly evicting Jadid’s men from the army and putting loyal friends and Alawis in key positions, building his personal power base with patronage, while cultivating a stable, business-like relationship with his critical arms suppliers, the Soviets. By 1969 Assad had essentially cleaved the army away from the civilian Baathists and made it his own, and Jadid and Assad were pulled into more direct confrontation.
Black September and Assad’s Black Eye
The Black September crisis was precipitated by a brutal Jordanian government struggle with Palestinian guerillas in its territory. Fearing an Israeli intervention if the Palestinians got the upper hand, Assad took the initiative and sent Syrian troops in to crush the Palestinians, only to be humiliated when King Husayn did the unthinkable, and invited Israeli intervention, forcing Assad’s army home with its tail between its legs .
Just 6 weeks after the death of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, when Jadid ordered Assad and Tlas stripped of all government power, Assad’s time had plainly come.
Assad Seizes Power
While coup orthodoxy is to seize mass media and make an announcement early to tip the balance of public opinion, Assad was not worried and for 3 long days, as Jadid and his loyalists were imprisoned , Syrian TV and radio reported nothing, when Assad did finally announce what he termed a “corrective movement” he was already in power .
Assad promptly set out to change all that he saw wrong with the Syrian government and Baath Party, embarking on a rapid institution building program, re-opening parliament and adopting a permanent constitution for the country. Working uphill for broader support after the detested Jadid regime, Assad had moved to the right, dropping class warfare to speak of reconciliation and unity. Assad reached out to the business class, went to provinces to speak and take complaints and petitions, extended more authority to popular organizations of workers, peasants, students, and women, made amends with the persecuted writers’ union, honored a Druze sultan, curbed the hated security services, freed low-level political prisoners, invited exiles home and cut food prices 15% . Almost immediately, Assad gained popularity and a measure of legitimacy.Politically, Assad grew the Baath party, 4 year congresses provided an important forum for idea exchange and a sense of democracy, non-Baathists were allowed to stand in new local councils in the 14 governorates and other parties allowed in the new coalition National Progressive Front (though none but the Baath Party were allowed to canvass the army or students), broadening the regime’s base. By bringing the opposition into the tent, the Baath Party was able to assume a watchdog role, overseeing elected officials with Assad always having the last word – creating elements of democratic participation without ceding real control, creating popular legitimacy but fundamentally securing power through the party, state security and the army . Despite the friendlier face of the regime, when military committee comrade Umran, a real threat to Assad’s power, sent a letter announcing his return from exile, it was not long before his body was found in Tripoli, leaving Assad as the lone Cairo Conspirator left standing.
The Muslim Brotherhood
Assad’s new Syrian constitution of 1973 did not stipulate a Muslim ruler nor declare Islam the state religion, sparking riots in religiously conservative Brotherhood stronghold of Hama. After getting a fatwa from an influential Iranian Shi’a cleric that affirmed Alawis to indeed be Muslims, Assad added a warning qualification about his Islam, “far removed from fanaticism…Islam is a religion of love, progress, social justice, equality for all, a religion which protects the small and great, the weak and strong, a religion in the true spirit of the age” .
Assad, redemption obsessed and psychologically tormented by Israel's annexation of Golan, naturally gravitated to foreign affairs. First and foremost Syria needed more arms from Moscow. Though Assad repeatedly refused a formal treaty of friendship, the Soviets warmed to Assad in his numerous visits to the USSR and concluded, unlike Sadat, Assad was not a danger to “go West” into the arms of America. Secondly Assad knew he must have Egypt, Syria’s obvious ally against the Israelis, fully on board, making Egypt’s war minister commander of both armies in 1971. As Soviet fighters, launchers and anti-aircraft systems poured in, soldiers and officers became much better trained, a clear battle plan was laid out and Arab communications were secure. It was clear that the Arab armies brought to their knees to beg for Israeli mercy in 1967 were very different by 1973.Though almost unbelievable in historical hindsight, most decisive for October 6th Arab success was the element of surprise. After the 1967 Israeli walkover, the Americans and Israelis were totally complacent, laughing off the prospect of an Arab attack as tantamount to suicide. Despite Sadat’s belligerent bluster, King Husayn’s warning Washington of an imminent Arab attack and an Arab spy delivering the Syrian-Egyptian war plan to the desks of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, on October 5th the CIA reported “neither side seems bent on initiating hostilities.” The Arab explanation that massive Arab troop and equipment mobilization days before the attack was a “routine autumn maneuver” seemed a sufficient explanation to the oblivious Israelis and Americans . 48 hours later 100,000 Egyptian troops and 1,000 tanks had crossed into Sinai, overwhelming the Israeli line, even successfully repelling an Israeli counterattack and 60,000 Syrians and 1,300 tanks had crossed the ‘Purple Line’ into Golan giving the Arab armies the clear upper hand and demonstrating that Israel was not invincible. In what Assad would call “the worst disappointment of the war,” Egypt then abandoned the battle plan, showing extreme caution in Israel’s moment of weakness by stopping the Egyptian advance and appealing to Kissinger in Washington for a quick peace deal rather than escalation. With the Egyptians waiting, for 3 days Syria faced the full fury of the Israeli Air Force all alone, which reclaimed Purple Line positions and bombed an oil refinery at Homs, Mediterranean ports and storage depots inside Syria. When Assad called on Sadat to bomb Israeli cities, Sadat demurred . With Damascus threatened and accusations of Egyptian betrayal flying, Sadat finally launched a too-late attack into Sinai on October 14th only to be obliterated and see some 45,000 Egyptian troops encircled before a ceasefire was arranged, putting Sadat in a weak bargaining position in the long land-for-peace negotiations that would follow .
The Kissinger Era of Middle East Relations
It was under Kissinger, a Jewish refugee of Nazi Germany openly attached to Israel that the US-Israeli alliance, that would come to dominate Middle East affairs, blossomed. In 1970, US aid to Israel (mostly for weapons purchases) was a paltry $30 million, when Kissinger became Sec. of State in 1973, he asked to up aid to $3 billion and got $2.2 billion (amounting to 42% of the Israeli defense budget). It was Kissinger who led the international effort, in the middle of the Arab oil embargo and intense US-Soviet competition for influence in the region, for a UN-sponsored peace . Facing the conventional wisdom, “No war without Egypt, no peace without Syria,” Kissinger, finding Sadat more pliable than Assad , pursued a bilateral Egypt-Israel deal and tried to limit Syrian interference, while wooing the Arab masses, “Soviets can give you arms, but the US can give you a fair solution by which your lands will be returned to you .” The Arabs thought they had earned peace with honor but Kissinger was adamant that US interests firmly aligned with Israel’s (to the 1975-76 tune of $2.5 billion, guarantees of US and Iranian oil and a US commitment to Israeli military strength and virtual Israeli veto on US Middle East policy ) and adopted the Israeli view that the Palestinians were not a political problem but a security problem and therefore must not be given any role or recognition in negotiations (though Arab governments would successfully lobby to get the PLO United Nations observer status and Yasser Arafat would address the General Assembly in 1974) .
The Shame of Camp David
The Israel-Palestine problem culminated with Egypt recognizing Israel by signing the Camp David Accords in 1979 – the death knell for hopes of an Arab Palestine – that would ultimately rip the Arab world to pieces. The effects of Israel-Palestine figured prominently in a long chain of Arab infighting that roiled the region; Iraqi Baathists fighting the Israeli-funded Kurds , Assad, out of a desperate need to confront Israel, reluctantly embracing King Husayn (who had used the “Israeli weapon” against him in the 1970 September Crisis) and Arafat (who Assad felt was the biggest obstacle to Arab states’ struggle with Israel), King Faysal taking sides with Assad to the tune of $350 million , Libya plotting to overthrow Sadat for courting Israel, Palestinian refugees sparking a Muslim vs. Christian civil war in Lebanon that led Assad to intervene to fight Muslims and Socialists to stop the Israel from doing so first, and, most painfully, Sadat capitulating and selling off Arab dignity with the Camp David Accords. Assad now had a long list of enemies; Palestinians in Lebanon who had faced Assad’s tanks that later enabled Lebanese Christians to massacre 3,000 refugees at Tal Al-Zatar camp, Arabs who accused Assad of betrayal and colluding with the US, Assad’s Soviet benefactors who were furious that he had taken out a true red socialist in Lebanese revolutionary Jumblatt, not to mention the Americans and Israelis who saw Assad as the most recalcitrant of their Arab enemies and no doubt relished the demise of his star power . For Assad and the Palestinians, Arab disunity had come at a very steep price.
Carter's Heart Goes Out to the Palestinians
Assad, never given to self-pity, responded by beefing up his Presidential Guard, renewing courtship of the Soviets and slowly trying to bring his Arab allies back on board. Though burnt by the US, the now more diplomatically seasoned Assad met with new US President Jimmy Carter and the “two country boys made good” were personally friendly. Carter, to the horror of American Jewish groups and Israelis (who had grown accustomed to being a US arms priority and being briefed before any US Middle East policy announcement), saw Palestinian injustice as akin to the injustice blacks had suffered in the American south and, as a pious Baptist, revered the holy lands, wanted Israeli withdrawal, an end to settlements and was serious about a comprehensive Middle East peace . But Zionist militant Israeli PM Menachem Begin and his Likud Party ally Ariel Sharon would have nothing of it. Begin privately called Carter a “creampuff” and after a full diplomatic and lobbying blitz, led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Carter did in fact buckle and back down under pressure.
After months of grinding negotiations, through back-channel diplomacy and manipulation of Sadat (culminating in Sadat’s dramatic hat-in-hand visit to Jerusalem on the Muslim Eid al-Adha), Israel was able to secure a bilateral deal, giving Egypt Sinai while retaining Syrian Golan and the Jordanian West Bank.Rumor had it that at the 11th hour, Sadat had rejected an Arab League offer of $5 billion/year for 10 years to renounce Camp David . For the livid Assad, it was blindingly obvious that without Egypt, Israeli supremacy was ensured and Israel could prey on Arab nations at will, picking them off one by one. Assad called the Camp David Accords, “the gravest setback in Arab history” and presciently remarked “anything short of a comprehensive peace involving all the parties was no peace at all” . The only consolation to Assad was that, with Egypt neutered and Israel menacing, Sadat was fully ostracized from the Arab camp .
The Hama Massacre of 1982
The climax of the 5 year battle occurred in Hama where a 2 a.m. army unit ambush was met with an all-out cry of Jihad from mosque loudspeakers that ended in a slaughter of over 70 Baathists that humiliated and shook the Assad regime. What followed was an overwhelming force of bombers, tanks, helitroopers and 12,000 men that over three bloody weeks butchered Islamists, civilians and families. It was called among "the single deadliest act by any Arab government against its own people in the modern Middle East " with government sympathizers putting deaths at 3,000 and critics claiming 20,000 or more. The Hama massacre seemed targeted not just at militants but at psychologically breaking puritan extremism and backwardness in the interior once and for all. Afterwards, cognizant of the destruction and heartache it had wrought, the Syrian government made a concerted effort to pour money into remaking Hama and healing wounds by building squares, gardens, schools and shopping malls.Despite its brutality, or perhaps because of the finality of its brutality, Syria breathed a collective sigh of relief after Hama. Though they had a broad swath of sympathizers, the Muslim guerillas had never advanced a coherent program beyond establishing the ‘Islamic Republic of Syria’ and their long campaign of terror had exhausted and horrified the population, hardly a way to build popularity, and many cheered their elimination . After vanquishing one of the most unnerving threats to his rule, Assad, always solitary, became more reclusive and harsh – slaughtering prisoners, turning tanks on residential areas and giving free reign to his Special Forces. Assad had been popular in 1970 but by 1982 he was feared . It was Assad’s Minister of Information who was the architect of Assad’s PR campaign which unified radio and print media to exalt Assad’s image as the tough, honest Nationalist – the modern Saladin – with ubiquitous pictures, statues and the new Assad library in Damascus in 1985.
Israel Gnaws at Assad
By the 1980s, with his propaganda machine whirring, Assad had outgrown his dreams of an honorable US-brokered peace and saw Israel as irredeemably aggressive and expansionist. His new mantra became ‘competitive strategic balance’ with Israel, not just militarily, but in terms of education, technology, social progress and external alliances (an ambitious, even naive, order considering Israel's economic advantages and generous superpower benefactor). In the words of Assad’s biographer Patrick Seale, “[Assad] had a deep rooted sense of the greatness of Syria, its centrality, its leading role in Arab politics – and the dignity of its leader .” In Assad’s view, the Palestine problem was too important to be left to Palestinians – it was the rightful concern of all Arabs – and he cast himself as the anti-Israel, the lone remaining effective barrier to Israeli domination of the Arabs.
The Enemy of My Enemy is My…?
Fellow Baathists and neighbors Saddam Hussein and Hafez Al-Assad had long accused each other of arms trafficking, propaganda and subversive plots to overthrow the other – they had that special hatred reserved for brothers. Though deeply unpopular and anathema to Pan-Arabism, when Saddam’s army invaded Iran in 1980, Assad jumped at the opportunity to support Khomeini and the Shi’a Iranians as Syria’s new anti-Zionist, anti-imperialist partners. Quite simply, Saddam most feared and hated Iran, Assad and Qaddafi most feared and hated Israel, whereas Iran likely had equal fear and hatred of both Iraq and Israel but nonetheless secretly bought arms from the Israelis (who hoped to watch their enemies Iran and Iraq mutually drain each other). Meanwhile King Husayn and King Fahd threw their weight behind their long-time enemy Saddam because Iran seemed the greater threat. If the Israeli game, as Assad’s conspiracy theory went, was to keep the Arabs perpetually fighting each other, the Arabs sure made it easy for them.
Again in 1990, with the US-led Gulf War coalition, the Arab world was bitterly divided about embracing what many saw as the US enemy to fight their Iraqi enemy. Perhaps no one was tormented more than Assad by the zero-sum-game mentality and impetuous, reactionary, shifting alliances and treachery that marked Arab politics after the birth of Israel. Understanding the convoluted, labyrinthine interplay of Middle East rivalries, historical grievances, kinship, and Arab psychological tendencies and counter-tendencies is the monumental, but requisite, challenge of understanding the dynamics of the struggle for the Middle East – with Syria arguably at the very center.After the Hama Massacre and Assad’s younger brother Refaat’s attempted coup in 1984 and subsequent exile, the remainder of the 1980s settled into a period of internal stability for Syria. The Syrian economy, though not booming the way it had in the 70s, appeared resilient and the education system was steadily improving. Assad had proved to be ruthless, using his intelligence and security networks and terrorist tactics at home and abroad to stop opponents, but also a wily politician, able to stay in power despite waves of challenges. Though tarnished by the association with terrorism, by the end of the 1980s, Assad had great international stature, had masterfully resisted internal Soviet influence despite Soviet largesse and was seen as essential to any solution to the Arab-Israeli problem and as a stabilizing influence in Lebanon, where he had used Syrian troops multiple times to quell unrest and crack down on Shi’a extremists . In the 1990s, the slowdown in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process paralleled a lack of progress in Israeli-Syrian relations. Israel had strengthened its hand by forming a strong strategic partnership with Syria’s giant northern neighbor Turkey and Assad anxiously sought to construct a countervailing alliance by resurrecting relations with Iraq, strengthening ties with Iran, and collaborating more closely with Saudi Arabia. In 1995 and again in 1999, Israel and Syria sat down for high-level talks but in both cases they soon broke down over discussions about the Golan Heights (home to an aquifer and key water resources along the Sea of Galilee so vital to desert nations with growing populations).
Though his outgoing and charismatic brother Basil had been groomed for power, when Basil died in a car accident in 1994, Bashar Al-Assad, a London-educated eye doctor married to a UK citizen, became the heir to the Syrian throne. Quiet, thoughtful, brooding and reclusive like his father, Bashar was summoned from London and began his 6 year apprenticeship for power, receiving military training and meeting key leaders. When the death of Hafiz Al-Assad brought Bashar to power in 2000 (parliament promptly amended the constitution to lower the minimum age for president from 40 to 34 for Bashar) , there was a brief period of openness, and talk of a “Damascus Spring,” political prisoners were freed and media and political restrictions were relaxed only to be retrenched when the Baath Party and the army grew increasingly alarmed by the pace of change. Leading democratic dissidents were arrested and the Damascus Spring came to an abrupt conclusion in 2001.
Patrick Seale, a British journalist and Middle East specialist, is Hafez Al-Assad’s unofficial biographer and the author of many books on the Middle East. Seale’s book, Asad: the Struggle for the Middle East, is the product of Seale’s direct access, both to Assad himself and to many top level Syrian government officials, over many years. The book provides an in-depth analysis not only of the man, but of contemporary Syrian history and politics. Seale clearly has a deep familiarity for the region and maintains a very convincing narrative throughout that demonstrates a profound understanding of Syrian psychology (Seale’s wife also happens to be Syrian) and of the complex power dynamics competing for influence in Syria and in the surrounding region. The author demonstrates a tremendous respect for Assad’s statecraft, intelligence and morality and paints a very persuasive picture of Hafez Al-Assad as one of the great, if misunderstood, modern Arab leaders. Though Seale provides a range of evidence for his analysis and interpretation of events, his clear sympathy for the Arab/Syrian cause and a range of accusations of US-Israeli underhandedness and deception make the book incendiary for many American audiences and politically sensitive. Syria and Israel, at the nexus of the most prolonged and debilitating geo-political conflict, are two nations that it is exceedingly difficult to be neutral and objective about. Seale makes an invaluable contribution to this highly-charged historical discussion and remains one of the foremost and indispensable experts on Syria today.
In contrast to Libya, Syria lies at the center of a dense network of Middle East relationships and regime change there would likely have a major impact on the regional structure of power. The protests that began in March 2011 in the southern city of Daraa (in the ‘security zone’ near the Jordanian border, therefore subject to additional red tape and security) and spread nationwide drew live fire from government troops and a swift cut of internet and phone access. Inflation, youth unemployment and heavy-handedness have fuelled anger and the protestor demands of basic freedoms, and an end to elite privilege and the Baath Party monopoly on power have been met with the Assad family’s four-decade tried and true – blame-foreign-instigators-and-crack-down approach. The two factors most decisive in the revolutionary success in Tunisia and Egypt;
1) the glare of international media attention and protestor exploitation of the internet and 2) an army unwilling to slaughter its own people, seem almost wholly absent (just like in Libya) in the more closed Syria with its loyal Alawi military officers . Unlike in Libya, where a no-fly zone and NATO bombing tipped the balance for rebels, the opposition Syrian National Council remains opposed to implementation of a no-fly zone, likely due to deep distrust of Western intentions and/or for fear of civilian casualties. Meanwhile, the US, despite the strategic ability to deal a major blow to Iran and help Israel by taking out Assad, shows no signs of intervening in Syria – either due to the US election season and budget woes, fear of being sucked into a long war with the Damascus-Hezbollah-Tehran-Hamas axis desperate not to lose its key Arab foothold, simple US exhaustion with Middle East wars or some combination of these, or most likely, fear of a region-wide, destabilizing Pandora’s box explosion of sectarian and political turmoil and violence. With Russia and China unwilling to condemn Syria in the UN and large pro-Bashar demonstrations and an ambivalent business community in Aleppo and Damascus, the opposition looks very weak indeed. The much publicized end of emergency law in April, in place since 1963, has not slowed violence against protestors and new anti-terror laws seem to have provided the regime the necessary alternatives to continue the crackdown. The recent Arab League pact Syria signed committing to withdrawing its forces from the streets, releasing political prisoners and engaging the opposition appears likely to be a paper promise to quiet the international community, as long as Western military intervention is off the table, Assad seems content to end the unrest by all means necessary. Over time, Bashar Al-Assad may prove as cunning, shrewd and resilient as his father and, barring high-level infighting brought on by economic sanctions, the Assad regime appears strong enough to weather the crisis and live on, dousing the flames of the Arab Spring before they overtake Damascus.
Below are some videos about Syria










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