The Hafez Mohammed Saeed Bounty, Code of the Pashtunwali and the US-Pakistani Cold War

Pakistan's Hafez Mohammed Saeed, the alleged mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai massacre, has reveled in the international media limelight since the State Department's announcement of a $10 million bounty on him, openly taunting the US at press conferences and rallies. Unlike the $25 million on Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the $10 million on Mullah Omar, the US bounty on Saeed is not for his capture but rather for “...information leading to [his] arrest or conviction1.” Therefore, when Saeed played the fearless anti-American hero and quipped “I will be in Lahore tomorrow, America can contact me whenever it wants to” and added that he should be entitled to the reward money for presenting himself, he, in all likelihood, was disingenuously playing to the crowd. The US wants evidence and hopes that the $10 million bait might entice those around Saeed to turn on him. The bounty aims to cement the US-India alliance and to cleave the “reliables” from the “unreliables” in the shadowy Pakistani establishment. The US believes – overwhelmingly after discovering Bin Laden in Abbottabad – that the Pakistani government is collectively, at best, unwilling to confront Saeed, Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT), the Taliban and Al Qaeda and, at worst, stands foursquare behind them (though less brazenly and more venally behind Al Qaeda because of fear of the US).

With war that could go nuclear off the table, US options are limited and the US desperately needs the help, albeit unreliable, of the ISI and Pakistani military in order to have a prayer of leaving Afghanistan honorably. Likewise, the bankrupt and besieged Pakistani establishment desperately needs the $2 billion of US military and economic aid, and the air of invincibility that comes with US backing. Neither side can afford total rupture but what type of relationship can be built on a foundation of mutual distrust, resentment and even hatred?
Pakistani Pashtunwali tribal values like honor, courage and especially revenge, which permeate the military as well as rural areas, make forgiving and forgetting things like the US support for Indian control of Kashmir, the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Raymond Davis affair, the estimated 260 drone attacks that have killed some 535 civilians and made a mockery of Pakistani sovereignty,2 and many more grievances, absolutely impossible. The US, meanwhile, fixated on Al Qaeda and looking past the India-targeting-LeT, can no longer ignore Pakistani duplicity, blackmailing the US for aid in exchange for a handful Al Qaeda arrests while, by all indications since at least 2006, funding, training and arming the resurgent Taliban and terrorist groups like LeT.
From this stalemate came the breakthrough in State Department thinking on Saeed. Recognition that Pakistan is not monolithic and that the US must be able to parse the Pakistani establishment, to draw a line in the sand, between those who supply intelligence to the US and those incriminated, thereby manufacturing a small circle with a modicum of business-like US-Pakistani trust. Furthermore, obtaining evidence against Saeed would likely facilitate prosecution of other members of LeT, the ISI and others. On the other hand, if no one comes forward then the the bounty may simply enable Saeed to capitalize on celebrity and propel his vociferous Difa-i Pakistani Council (DPC) campaign against the restoration of the NATO supply route (which was stopped by Islamabad last November after the deaths of 26 Pakistani soldiers from a US airstrike), drone attacks and to break relations completely with the US.
In short, anti-Americanism was already at a rolling boil in Pakistan and Saeed's enormous potential as a demagogue was given a tremendous boost by the US bounty. By choosing the very public means of a bounty the US sparked a media bonanza, and because of Saeed's broad popular support, the US is playing with fire because, even if evidence comes in and Saeed is apprehended, at what cost in Pakistani hearts and minds? The widespread Pakistani resentment of the US – the terrorist enabling environment – will fester and produce more Saeeds.
As quintessentially mass-mobilizing and emotionally explosive as Palestine is for the proud and vengeful Arabs, Kashmir is for the proud and vengeful Pakistanis. While the short-term strategy of the bounty may have been unavoidable and it could off some short-term stability if successful, until the roots of rage in both Palestine and Kashmir are dealt with in a way that restores Arab and Pashtun dignity, the US will remain stuck on the strategic security treadmill, hemorrhaging billions every year without improving the long-term outlook in the war on terror.
2 Bureau for Investigative Journalism (BIJ) London

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