The Hafez Mohammed Saeed Bounty, Code of the Pashtunwali and the US-Pakistani Cold War
Pakistan's
Hafez Mohammed Saeed, the alleged mastermind behind the 2008 Mumbai
massacre, has reveled in the international media limelight since the
State Department's announcement of a $10 million bounty on him,
openly taunting the US at press conferences and rallies. Unlike the
$25 million on Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the $10 million on Mullah Omar,
the US bounty on Saeed is not for his capture but rather for
“...information leading to [his] arrest or conviction1.”
Therefore, when Saeed played the fearless anti-American hero and
quipped “I will be in Lahore tomorrow, America can contact me
whenever it wants to” and added that he should be entitled to the
reward money for presenting himself, he, in all likelihood, was
disingenuously playing to the crowd. The US wants evidence
and hopes that the $10 million bait might entice those around Saeed
to turn on him. The bounty aims to cement the US-India alliance and
to cleave the “reliables” from the “unreliables” in the
shadowy Pakistani establishment. The US believes – overwhelmingly
after discovering Bin Laden in Abbottabad –
that the Pakistani government is collectively, at best, unwilling to
confront Saeed, Lashkar-e
Tayyiba (LeT), the Taliban and Al Qaeda and, at worst, stands
foursquare behind them (though less brazenly and more venally behind
Al Qaeda because of fear of the US).
With
war that could go nuclear off the table, US options are limited and
the US desperately needs the help, albeit unreliable, of the ISI and
Pakistani military in order to have a prayer of leaving Afghanistan
honorably. Likewise, the bankrupt and besieged Pakistani
establishment desperately needs the $2 billion of US military and
economic aid, and the air of invincibility that comes with US
backing. Neither side can afford total rupture but what type of
relationship can be built on a foundation of mutual distrust,
resentment and even hatred?
Pakistani
Pashtunwali tribal values like honor, courage and especially revenge,
which permeate the military as well as rural areas, make forgiving
and forgetting things like the US support for Indian control of
Kashmir, the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Raymond Davis affair,
the estimated 260 drone attacks that have killed some 535 civilians
and made a mockery of Pakistani sovereignty,2
and many more grievances, absolutely impossible. The US, meanwhile,
fixated on Al Qaeda and looking past the India-targeting-LeT, can no
longer ignore Pakistani duplicity, blackmailing the US for aid in
exchange for a handful Al Qaeda arrests while, by all indications
since at least 2006, funding, training and arming the resurgent
Taliban and terrorist groups like LeT.
From
this stalemate came the breakthrough in State Department thinking on
Saeed. Recognition that Pakistan is not monolithic and that the US
must be able to parse the Pakistani establishment, to draw a line in
the sand, between those who supply intelligence to the US and those
incriminated, thereby manufacturing a small circle with a modicum of
business-like US-Pakistani trust. Furthermore, obtaining evidence
against Saeed would likely facilitate prosecution of other members of
LeT, the ISI and others. On the other hand, if no one comes forward
then the the bounty may simply enable Saeed to capitalize on
celebrity and propel his vociferous Difa-i Pakistani Council (DPC)
campaign against the restoration of the NATO supply route (which was
stopped by Islamabad last November after the deaths of 26 Pakistani
soldiers from a US airstrike), drone attacks and to break relations
completely with the US.
In
short, anti-Americanism was already at a rolling boil in Pakistan and
Saeed's enormous potential as a demagogue was given a tremendous
boost by the US bounty. By choosing the very public means of a
bounty the US sparked a media bonanza, and because of Saeed's broad
popular support, the US is playing with fire because, even if
evidence comes in and Saeed is apprehended, at what cost in Pakistani
hearts and minds? The widespread Pakistani resentment of the US –
the terrorist enabling environment – will fester and produce more
Saeeds.
As
quintessentially mass-mobilizing and emotionally explosive as
Palestine is for the proud and vengeful Arabs, Kashmir is for the
proud and vengeful Pakistanis. While the short-term strategy of the
bounty may have been unavoidable and it could off some short-term
stability if successful, until the roots of rage in both Palestine
and Kashmir are dealt with in a way that restores Arab and Pashtun
dignity, the US will remain stuck on the strategic security
treadmill, hemorrhaging billions every year without improving the
long-term outlook in the war on terror.
2
Bureau for Investigative Journalism (BIJ) London
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