US-Pakistan Relations: Complicit or Clueless about Bin Laden?
Few events captivated American and world attention in 2011 like the culmination of the largest manhunt in history with the killing of Osama Bin Laden by US commandos raiding his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. For years, most US authorities had speculated Bin Laden was likely in the lawless Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and the popular imagination pictured him cowering in a cave. But as President Obama stood at the podium and the news began to come in that he had in fact been living in a large million dollar compound with 12 to 18 foot walls in the well-to-do military town of Abbottabad, perhaps since as early as 2006, and that the raid had been carried out without any Pakistani knowledge for fear that they would tip off Bin Laden, a wave of bewilderment, alarm and questions swept the nation.
Friend
or Foe?
How
could the most wanted man on the planet have been living in the
Pakistani equivalent of West Point in a massive, conspicuous
compound, less than a mile from the academy itself no less, and the
military have had no idea? If Pakistani authorities were harboring
or even aware of Bin Laden's presence, how can we still be allies?
What should the US do now about Pakistan? The mother of all
questions for US foreign policy towards Pakistan is whether, and to
what degree, the Pakistani establishment was clueless
or complicit
about Osama Bin Laden's whereabouts inside Pakistan. More
specifically, who knew what and when and, if some knew, why did they
not share this information with US authorities? This paper will
argue that, at the very least, individuals
in the Pakistani army and ISI certainly knew Osama Bin Laden was
living in Abbottabad for years. That said, if the marriage is still
worth saving, the US must swallow residual bitterness and give
Pakistan a way out by showing a degree of magnanimity and tolerance
towards all but global jihadists and immediate local security
threats. It must raise the standard of caution for drone strikes,
explicitly define realistic
expectations based on an understanding of regional dynamics and the
Pakistani attitude towards the US, and leverage US aid (the US has
given over $25 billion to Pakistan since 2001) to incentivize
informants and greater counter-global-jihad cooperation. The
fundamental dilemma facing US policymakers is that US short-term
tactical, security objectives are generally at cross-purposes with
long-term diplomatic and public relations objectives – the former
is how you deal with enemies, the latter how you make friends. Given
the ambivalence of the relationship, the US must attempt to shrewdly
combine the two, while gradually shifting focus to long-term
objectives.
The US Pawn in the South
Asian Chess Match
While
this paper focuses on the degree of complicity of the Pakistani
establishment in harboring Bin Laden and AQ, also examining the
larger backdrop and context of Pakistan's related role supporting the
Taliban, and the India-targeting Pakistani military creation
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) sheds light on where Pakistani hearts and
priorities lie. The Americans are seen merely as ephemeral
interlopers whereas the Afghans, Indians and Iranians will be
Pakistan's neighbors forever – rendering deception
to be a central pillar of Pakistani post-9/11 relations with the US.
American policy must summon the serenity to accept that this cannot
be changed and work around it. Also it should be remembered that,
with their shared willingness to violently impose their strict
interpretation of Sharia, there is a reason why the Taliban took in
AQ in in the first place – they are kindred spirits both hellbent
on killing Americans, AQ is just international.
The Taliban: Same Blood Runs
Through Our Veins
The
Taliban backstory begins with the Afghan and Arab Mujahideen
triumphantly doing the unthinkable and driving the supposedly mighty
Soviets out of Afghanistan in 1989. Without its benefactor, the
Afghan communist government of Najibullah fell in 1992 and by 1994
the Pakistanis and their Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency
began providing operational, financial and military support to the
emerging Pashtun force the Taliban. With common blood, the common
language of Pashto and the common cultural ethics of Pashtunwali,
the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and in Pakistan are one people and don't
recognize the border between them. No wonder then that Pakistan,
with its deep cultural affinity to Pashtuns, and Afghans in general,
as well as its regional ambitions vis-a-vis neighboring rivals Iran
and eternal archenemy India, would want a dog in the fight as
Afghanistan descended into chaos, ultimately throwing the weight of
the ISI and Pakistani state behind the Pashtun Taliban and
cultivating it into a proxy force to promote Pakistani regional
interests.
When the US invasion of
Afghanistan came in October 2001, Pakistani support for the Taliban
had been largely pushed underground, but if your family was about to
be attacked what would you do? Sure enough the Pakistani air force
came to the rescue when American bombs began to fall, and over some
seven hours, Pakistani airplanes evacuated much of the Taliban
leadership, out of northern Afghanistan to Pakistan, in the “Kunduz
Airlift.” Wounded Talibs that arrived in Pakistani hospitals were
honored like heroes much like America, or any nation, would honor and
care for their wounded patriots fighting foreign invaders. By
providing early sanctuary and support for the Taliban during the
brunt of the American onslaught, and later providing weapons and
training, Pakistan ensured the Taliban's survival and later
resurgence. In short, the Pakistani government, through the highest
levels, fathered and raised the Taliban and it will always be family
– the US must learn to live with Taliban rule of Afghanistan.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Al
Qaeda: Am I My Brother's Keeper?
If
ties that bind are based on; shared history, cultural affinity,
popular politics and strategic interests, the Taliban-Pakistan
connection is like brothers, so strong that the distinction between
the two is blurred, whereas the Taliban and AQ are more like cousins,
they may have a symbiotic relationship but they remain separate
entities, and the Pakistani commitment to AQ is like that to an
unruly “friend” that causes you trouble – more discordant and
nowhere near as strong as Pakistan's relationship to the Taliban and
LeT.
By
this same calculus, the limited US-Pakistani relationship, based only
on strategic interests and quid pro quo bartering of AQ members for
US aid, can never yield real loyalty. In late 2001, realizing it
would be suicide to back AQ as brazenly, albeit secretly, as they had
the Taliban, Pakistan engaged in cooperative raids night after night
with US forces, arresting AQ members and the Bush administration,
either in denial about the gaping holes in Pakistani cooperation or
being strategically disingenuous, expressed gratitude in dollars and
by naming Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally.” Meanwhile, despite
pressure, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf gave the US virtually
no top Taliban figures. Naturally, Pakistani arrests of AQ leaders
soured already tense Pakistani-AQ relations (AQ, of course, abhors
and resents the unholy alliance Pakistan struck with the US in 2001),
and AQ attempted to assassinate Musharraf multiple times in 2002,
2003 and again in 2007, prompting a massive retaliatory Pakistani
army offensive against AQ in south Waziristan. Understanding this
conflicted, even openly warring, AQ-Pakistani establishment
relationship is critical to deducing the nature of the complicity –
likely a reluctant association bound tenuously by Islam, the Taliban
and the fact that they both hate America more than they hate each
other.
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
Because the Pakistani
government and military denies all accusations, concrete evidence
proving Pakistani government complicity would work wonders for US
objectives. While US authorities believe the ISI had long-time links
with militant groups targeting India and Kashmir and even encouraging
AQ contacts, there is a lot of hearsay and the available evidence is
mostly circumstantial. For example, when Wall Street Journal
reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and eventually beheaded in 2002,
the kidnapper demands included the US release of a halted shipment of
F-16 fighter jets to the Pakistani government. Not very subtle, but
not enough for a courtroom conviction. When Pearl's kidnapper Omar
Sheikh, a British national of Pakistani descent linked to the ISI
since the 1990s, turned himself in, the ISI kept it secret for over a
week before handing Sheikh over to police. Anecdotal evidence of ISI
operatives dressed as mullahs, preachers or Muslim scholars abounds.
And perhaps most damning in scope, are accounts from former Taliban
commander Mullah Qasim and others of a virtual Taliban government in
exile given sanctuary in or near the Pakistani border town of Quetta
beginning in 2003 with openly visible recruiting, fundraising and
training camps for launching attacks on the new Afghan government and
US forces. Other events only bred speculation, like when spies
believed they had pinpointed Ayman Al-Zawahiri but the resulting
Pakistani army operation surprisingly came up empty. The 7/7 London
underground bombers of 2005 are widely believed to have trained at
camps in Pakistan, the presumption behind these allegations being
that a police state with as many checkpoints as Pakistan, if it wants
to, knows virtually everything that takes place inside its borders.
Finally, the vast majority of US drone attacks that Pakistanis were
forewarned about missed their targets whereas subsequent
'unannounced' attacks had a much higher success rate. Still others
speculate that maintaining the “AQ threat” is necessary for
Pakistan to continue receiving “strategic rent” from the US.
Similar thinking argues that Pakistan, and in particular the military
and Machiavellian ISI, do not want the Taliban to negotiate a
political deal, because continued chaos empowers the military and
marginalizes civilian rivals for power. Peace in Afghanistan also
means that American interests and interest in the region will plummet
as will US valuation of the alliance with Pakistan and the aid –
which the army gets the lion's share of – that comes with it.
Inside the Pakistani Psyche:
The Jihadi Sympathy Spectrum
Rather
than the dichotomous clueless
or complicit,
a more enlightening framework is to think of a spectrum within the
Pakistani establishment and general public, with those who think
global Jihadism like 9/11 is completely justified on one end, those
who don't care about or doubt the justice of global jihad but think
local jihad within south Asia targeting non-combatants like LeT is
justified near the middle of the spectrum and those who think the
jihad against the American invaders is justified but think targeting
any non-combatants, anywhere, is not at all justified on the opposite
end of the spectrum. Note that there is no place on the spectrum for
Pakistanis who don't support the war in Afghanistan against America.
To be clear, many Pakistani's undoubtedly like and admire aspects of
American culture and values, but virtually no Pakistanis like
the American government and military. How could they? Fully
internalizing the layout of the above spectrum and understanding the
basics of the very active, heated, emotional debate throughout the
Islamic world about the proper place to be along this spectrum –
where browbeating and macho pride often tilt the balance towards
global jihad – is requisite for policymakers to answer the real
challenges of the war on terror over the next decade.
The George W. Bush
administration embraced the “Israeli approach” to the war on
terror; short-term security is the dominant paradigm, bombings,
covert operations, exploitation of internal divisions, propaganda and
punitive and preemptive police action that holds states responsible
for terrorist activities inside their borders are the means,
dismissing collateral damage and the popular resentment it breeds is
the norm while relying almost exclusively on negative reinforcement
at the expense of long-term interests. Never mind the manifest
debate about the effectiveness of such an approach, Pakistan has;
over 180 million people, more terrorists than any other country, the
fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world which could not be
comprehensively secured in the event of a US invasion, and an
agitable nuclear neighbor in India. The likelihood of nuclear
holocaust means that a regime-change-war is off the table. Without a
credible threat of invasion, the US is castrated and forced into an
awkward stance. These limits of American willingness to 'play
hardball' revealed themselves in January 2009, when US forces,
suspecting Pakistanis were tipping off targets, began mounting secret
raids into Pakistan to hunt the Taliban. Pakistan called the US
bluff and blocked passage of the 85% of NATO supplies which pass
through Pakistan. The US quickly relented and agreed to stop the
secret raids.
Lose the Battle Win the War
After 9/11 and the financially
and psychologically exhausting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an axiom
of US policy in the Muslim world should be; never put US soldiers on
the ground, that is what empowers AQ. A further nefarious effect of
wars is what might be called “global jihad ideology creep.” The
Mujahideen in the 1980s fertilized the seeds of global jihad that
grew into Al Qaeda, the post 9/11 wars brought a new generation of
international jihadists together and created a certain alchemy. The
interaction, personal relationships and idea exchange among fighters
of the American invaders in the battlefield and training camp forums
of Iraq and Afghanistan serve as an incubator for the ideology of
global jihad and formerly local thinkers, like the Taliban, begin to
think globally.
In
conclusion, why did no Pakistanis share information with us about
Osama Bin Laden? Because Pakistanis despise us and know we will be
gone soon. A better question is why would
the Pakistanis cooperate and be loyal to American interests?
America-centric conceit, naivety and self-obliviousness are necessary
to not see this plainly by now. There is no question that elements
of the Pakistani establishment were complicit but we may never know
exactly how far and wide was the complicity. From this stance of
uncertainty, the US should continue to aggressively seek evidence to
answer the complicity question, the recent $10 million bounty for
evidence that leads to the conviction of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed may
indeed bear fruit, but this tactic is still within the short-term
security-focused, punitive Israeli approach. In order to actually
win
the war on terror in Pakistan rather than just perpetuate it,
policymakers must develop a profound understanding of the jihadi
spectrum and of the entire region while transitioning to a focus on
broader objectives such as winning hearts and minds to achieve peace,
stability and economic development in the long-term rther than the
narrow short-term security concerns that have dominated policymaking
since 9/11.
References
Officials:
White House Offers to Curtail Drones. Army Times. 26 Mar 2012
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/03/ap-white-house-offers-curtail-drones-pakistan-032612/
Osama Bin Laden's Life in
Hiding. Daily Beast.
Pakistan's
Musharraf Has Been Accused of Knowing Osama Bin Laden's Hideout.
Daily Beast 14 Feb 2012
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/30/did-bin-laden-s-widow-lie.html
Wikileaks:
Pakistan Army Officials 'Knew of Bin Laden House.' BBC.28 Feb 2012
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17188120
Obama
Defends US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, BBC. 31 Jan 2012.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16804247
BBC
Secret: Pakistan Double Cross on Terrorism
http://youtu.be/6_SkNUorWhc
President
Obama announcing Osama Bin Laden's killing
http://youtu.be/ZNYmK19-d0U
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