US-Pakistan Relations: Complicit or Clueless about Bin Laden?

Few events captivated American and world attention in 2011 like the culmination of the largest manhunt in history with the killing of Osama Bin Laden by US commandos raiding his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. For years, most US authorities had speculated Bin Laden was likely in the lawless Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and the popular imagination pictured him cowering in a cave. But as President Obama stood at the podium and the news began to come in that he had in fact been living in a large million dollar compound with 12 to 18 foot walls in the well-to-do military town of Abbottabad, perhaps since as early as 2006, and that the raid had been carried out without any Pakistani knowledge for fear that they would tip off Bin Laden, a wave of bewilderment, alarm and questions swept the nation.
Friend or Foe?
How could the most wanted man on the planet have been living in the Pakistani equivalent of West Point in a massive, conspicuous compound, less than a mile from the academy itself no less, and the military have had no idea? If Pakistani authorities were harboring or even aware of Bin Laden's presence, how can we still be allies? What should the US do now about Pakistan? The mother of all questions for US foreign policy towards Pakistan is whether, and to what degree, the Pakistani establishment was clueless or complicit about Osama Bin Laden's whereabouts inside Pakistan. More specifically, who knew what and when and, if some knew, why did they not share this information with US authorities? This paper will argue that, at the very least, individuals in the Pakistani army and ISI certainly knew Osama Bin Laden was living in Abbottabad for years. That said, if the marriage is still worth saving, the US must swallow residual bitterness and give Pakistan a way out by showing a degree of magnanimity and tolerance towards all but global jihadists and immediate local security threats. It must raise the standard of caution for drone strikes, explicitly define realistic expectations based on an understanding of regional dynamics and the Pakistani attitude towards the US, and leverage US aid (the US has given over $25 billion to Pakistan since 2001) to incentivize informants and greater counter-global-jihad cooperation. The fundamental dilemma facing US policymakers is that US short-term tactical, security objectives are generally at cross-purposes with long-term diplomatic and public relations objectives – the former is how you deal with enemies, the latter how you make friends. Given the ambivalence of the relationship, the US must attempt to shrewdly combine the two, while gradually shifting focus to long-term objectives.
The US Pawn in the South Asian Chess Match
While this paper focuses on the degree of complicity of the Pakistani establishment in harboring Bin Laden and AQ, also examining the larger backdrop and context of Pakistan's related role supporting the Taliban, and the India-targeting Pakistani military creation Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) sheds light on where Pakistani hearts and priorities lie. The Americans are seen merely as ephemeral interlopers whereas the Afghans, Indians and Iranians will be Pakistan's neighbors forever – rendering deception to be a central pillar of Pakistani post-9/11 relations with the US. American policy must summon the serenity to accept that this cannot be changed and work around it. Also it should be remembered that, with their shared willingness to violently impose their strict interpretation of Sharia, there is a reason why the Taliban took in AQ in in the first place – they are kindred spirits both hellbent on killing Americans, AQ is just international.
The Taliban: Same Blood Runs Through Our Veins
The Taliban backstory begins with the Afghan and Arab Mujahideen triumphantly doing the unthinkable and driving the supposedly mighty Soviets out of Afghanistan in 1989. Without its benefactor, the Afghan communist government of Najibullah fell in 1992 and by 1994 the Pakistanis and their Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency began providing operational, financial and military support to the emerging Pashtun force the Taliban. With common blood, the common language of Pashto and the common cultural ethics of Pashtunwali, the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and in Pakistan are one people and don't recognize the border between them. No wonder then that Pakistan, with its deep cultural affinity to Pashtuns, and Afghans in general, as well as its regional ambitions vis-a-vis neighboring rivals Iran and eternal archenemy India, would want a dog in the fight as Afghanistan descended into chaos, ultimately throwing the weight of the ISI and Pakistani state behind the Pashtun Taliban and cultivating it into a proxy force to promote Pakistani regional interests.
When the US invasion of Afghanistan came in October 2001, Pakistani support for the Taliban had been largely pushed underground, but if your family was about to be attacked what would you do? Sure enough the Pakistani air force came to the rescue when American bombs began to fall, and over some seven hours, Pakistani airplanes evacuated much of the Taliban leadership, out of northern Afghanistan to Pakistan, in the “Kunduz Airlift.” Wounded Talibs that arrived in Pakistani hospitals were honored like heroes much like America, or any nation, would honor and care for their wounded patriots fighting foreign invaders. By providing early sanctuary and support for the Taliban during the brunt of the American onslaught, and later providing weapons and training, Pakistan ensured the Taliban's survival and later resurgence. In short, the Pakistani government, through the highest levels, fathered and raised the Taliban and it will always be family – the US must learn to live with Taliban rule of Afghanistan.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Al Qaeda: Am I My Brother's Keeper?
If ties that bind are based on; shared history, cultural affinity, popular politics and strategic interests, the Taliban-Pakistan connection is like brothers, so strong that the distinction between the two is blurred, whereas the Taliban and AQ are more like cousins, they may have a symbiotic relationship but they remain separate entities, and the Pakistani commitment to AQ is like that to an unruly “friend” that causes you trouble – more discordant and nowhere near as strong as Pakistan's relationship to the Taliban and LeT. By this same calculus, the limited US-Pakistani relationship, based only on strategic interests and quid pro quo bartering of AQ members for US aid, can never yield real loyalty. In late 2001, realizing it would be suicide to back AQ as brazenly, albeit secretly, as they had the Taliban, Pakistan engaged in cooperative raids night after night with US forces, arresting AQ members and the Bush administration, either in denial about the gaping holes in Pakistani cooperation or being strategically disingenuous, expressed gratitude in dollars and by naming Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally.” Meanwhile, despite pressure, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf gave the US virtually no top Taliban figures. Naturally, Pakistani arrests of AQ leaders soured already tense Pakistani-AQ relations (AQ, of course, abhors and resents the unholy alliance Pakistan struck with the US in 2001), and AQ attempted to assassinate Musharraf multiple times in 2002, 2003 and again in 2007, prompting a massive retaliatory Pakistani army offensive against AQ in south Waziristan. Understanding this conflicted, even openly warring, AQ-Pakistani establishment relationship is critical to deducing the nature of the complicity – likely a reluctant association bound tenuously by Islam, the Taliban and the fact that they both hate America more than they hate each other.
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?
Because the Pakistani government and military denies all accusations, concrete evidence proving Pakistani government complicity would work wonders for US objectives. While US authorities believe the ISI had long-time links with militant groups targeting India and Kashmir and even encouraging AQ contacts, there is a lot of hearsay and the available evidence is mostly circumstantial. For example, when Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and eventually beheaded in 2002, the kidnapper demands included the US release of a halted shipment of F-16 fighter jets to the Pakistani government. Not very subtle, but not enough for a courtroom conviction. When Pearl's kidnapper Omar Sheikh, a British national of Pakistani descent linked to the ISI since the 1990s, turned himself in, the ISI kept it secret for over a week before handing Sheikh over to police. Anecdotal evidence of ISI operatives dressed as mullahs, preachers or Muslim scholars abounds. And perhaps most damning in scope, are accounts from former Taliban commander Mullah Qasim and others of a virtual Taliban government in exile given sanctuary in or near the Pakistani border town of Quetta beginning in 2003 with openly visible recruiting, fundraising and training camps for launching attacks on the new Afghan government and US forces. Other events only bred speculation, like when spies believed they had pinpointed Ayman Al-Zawahiri but the resulting Pakistani army operation surprisingly came up empty. The 7/7 London underground bombers of 2005 are widely believed to have trained at camps in Pakistan, the presumption behind these allegations being that a police state with as many checkpoints as Pakistan, if it wants to, knows virtually everything that takes place inside its borders. Finally, the vast majority of US drone attacks that Pakistanis were forewarned about missed their targets whereas subsequent 'unannounced' attacks had a much higher success rate. Still others speculate that maintaining the “AQ threat” is necessary for Pakistan to continue receiving “strategic rent” from the US. Similar thinking argues that Pakistan, and in particular the military and Machiavellian ISI, do not want the Taliban to negotiate a political deal, because continued chaos empowers the military and marginalizes civilian rivals for power. Peace in Afghanistan also means that American interests and interest in the region will plummet as will US valuation of the alliance with Pakistan and the aid – which the army gets the lion's share of – that comes with it.
Inside the Pakistani Psyche: The Jihadi Sympathy Spectrum
Rather than the dichotomous clueless or complicit, a more enlightening framework is to think of a spectrum within the Pakistani establishment and general public, with those who think global Jihadism like 9/11 is completely justified on one end, those who don't care about or doubt the justice of global jihad but think local jihad within south Asia targeting non-combatants like LeT is justified near the middle of the spectrum and those who think the jihad against the American invaders is justified but think targeting any non-combatants, anywhere, is not at all justified on the opposite end of the spectrum. Note that there is no place on the spectrum for Pakistanis who don't support the war in Afghanistan against America. To be clear, many Pakistani's undoubtedly like and admire aspects of American culture and values, but virtually no Pakistanis like the American government and military. How could they? Fully internalizing the layout of the above spectrum and understanding the basics of the very active, heated, emotional debate throughout the Islamic world about the proper place to be along this spectrum – where browbeating and macho pride often tilt the balance towards global jihad – is requisite for policymakers to answer the real challenges of the war on terror over the next decade.
The George W. Bush administration embraced the “Israeli approach” to the war on terror; short-term security is the dominant paradigm, bombings, covert operations, exploitation of internal divisions, propaganda and punitive and preemptive police action that holds states responsible for terrorist activities inside their borders are the means, dismissing collateral damage and the popular resentment it breeds is the norm while relying almost exclusively on negative reinforcement at the expense of long-term interests. Never mind the manifest debate about the effectiveness of such an approach, Pakistan has; over 180 million people, more terrorists than any other country, the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world which could not be comprehensively secured in the event of a US invasion, and an agitable nuclear neighbor in India. The likelihood of nuclear holocaust means that a regime-change-war is off the table. Without a credible threat of invasion, the US is castrated and forced into an awkward stance. These limits of American willingness to 'play hardball' revealed themselves in January 2009, when US forces, suspecting Pakistanis were tipping off targets, began mounting secret raids into Pakistan to hunt the Taliban. Pakistan called the US bluff and blocked passage of the 85% of NATO supplies which pass through Pakistan. The US quickly relented and agreed to stop the secret raids.
Lose the Battle Win the War
After 9/11 and the financially and psychologically exhausting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, an axiom of US policy in the Muslim world should be; never put US soldiers on the ground, that is what empowers AQ. A further nefarious effect of wars is what might be called “global jihad ideology creep.” The Mujahideen in the 1980s fertilized the seeds of global jihad that grew into Al Qaeda, the post 9/11 wars brought a new generation of international jihadists together and created a certain alchemy. The interaction, personal relationships and idea exchange among fighters of the American invaders in the battlefield and training camp forums of Iraq and Afghanistan serve as an incubator for the ideology of global jihad and formerly local thinkers, like the Taliban, begin to think globally.
In conclusion, why did no Pakistanis share information with us about Osama Bin Laden? Because Pakistanis despise us and know we will be gone soon. A better question is why would the Pakistanis cooperate and be loyal to American interests? America-centric conceit, naivety and self-obliviousness are necessary to not see this plainly by now. There is no question that elements of the Pakistani establishment were complicit but we may never know exactly how far and wide was the complicity. From this stance of uncertainty, the US should continue to aggressively seek evidence to answer the complicity question, the recent $10 million bounty for evidence that leads to the conviction of Hafiz Mohammed Saeed may indeed bear fruit, but this tactic is still within the short-term security-focused, punitive Israeli approach. In order to actually win the war on terror in Pakistan rather than just perpetuate it, policymakers must develop a profound understanding of the jihadi spectrum and of the entire region while transitioning to a focus on broader objectives such as winning hearts and minds to achieve peace, stability and economic development in the long-term rther than the narrow short-term security concerns that have dominated policymaking since 9/11.


References
Officials: White House Offers to Curtail Drones. Army Times. 26 Mar 2012 http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/03/ap-white-house-offers-curtail-drones-pakistan-032612/

Osama Bin Laden's Life in Hiding. Daily Beast.

Pakistan's Musharraf Has Been Accused of Knowing Osama Bin Laden's Hideout. Daily Beast 14 Feb 2012 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/30/did-bin-laden-s-widow-lie.html

Wikileaks: Pakistan Army Officials 'Knew of Bin Laden House.' BBC.28 Feb 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17188120

Obama Defends US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, BBC. 31 Jan 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16804247

BBC Secret: Pakistan Double Cross on Terrorism http://youtu.be/6_SkNUorWhc

President Obama announcing Osama Bin Laden's killing http://youtu.be/ZNYmK19-d0U


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